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During 1998-2005, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) conducted a historically unprecedented and 
extraordinary monetary policy: both the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative 
easing (QE) on top of ZIRP. In spring 1999, ZIRP was introduced but it was constrained by 
the so-called zero bound problem. Therefore, worsening deflation meant the real interest rate 
would rise, aggravating recession and hence deflation. In order to fend off this problem, QE 
was introduced in March 2001 on top of ZIRP, but deflation remained at between –1 and  
–0.6% during 2001-02 (Figure 2 in Prof Ito’s paper). Despite the continued deflation, 
however, the Japanese economy started to recover steadily after July-September 2002, by 
registering annual growth rates of 1.8%, 2.3% and 2.6% in 2003, 2004 and 2005, 
respectively. The Bank of Japan exited from QE in March 2006 and also terminated ZIRP in 
June 2006. 
The objective of Prof Ito’s paper is to critically review the BOJ Board members’ discussions 
and decisions about policy actions taken during this fascinating period, the beginning of 
which almost coincided with the timing of the BOJ’s legal independence in March 1998, 
Prof Ito examined the timing of the introduction of ZIRP, its temporary termination (between 
August 2000 and March 2001) and the effectiveness of QE. 
In light of the well defined objective of the paper, Prof Ito focuses on the recent history of 
BOJ monetary policy, and provides us with extremely useful descriptions of pros and cons 
debates among the Board members at the critical times of policy changes. However, his 
paper hardly examines the effectiveness of ZIRP or QE nor the robust recovery of the 
Japanese economy since mid-2002 which took place even under the deflationary 
environment. If accompanied by examining the effectiveness of ZIRP and QE, Prof Ito’s 
critical review of BOJ’s policy actions would be much more convincing and powerful. Let me 
give several important examples on this last point. 
Prof Ito claimed that ZIRP could have been introduced by early 1995, a judgment based on 
the Taylor-rule simulated call rate. Furthermore, he claimed that the BOJ’s hesitation in the 
adoption of ZIRP was attributable to Japanese politics since the BOJ was not legally 
independent at that time. However, Prof Ito did not concretely explain the characteristics of 
the political pressure. During 1995-96, the Japanese economy recovered rather strongly, 
registering actual growth of about 2.5% per year. Only after the banking system crisis took 
place in November 1997 did the economic and political environment vastly change. 
Therefore, Prof Ito could strongly claim that the BOJ should rather immediately introduce 
ZIRP after the banking crisis which deepened a recession and hence created deflation. The 
BOJ did not introduce ZIRP until March 1999 because Governor Hayami held the view that 
deflation was not something worrisome and that ZIRP might hurt households’ interest 
income, as Prof Ito mentioned in the paper.  
Prof Ito’s second criticism was against the BOJ’s temporary termination of ZIRP (raising the 
interest rate from 0% to 0.25%) between August 2000 and March 2001. While he admitted 
that this interest increase by 0.25% was small enough not to disturb investment or 
consumption, Prof Ito considered this BOJ judgment was a mistake, simply because CPI 
                                                  
1   President and CRO, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). 138  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
deflation continued and because many predicted slower economic growth in the United 
States and Japan due to the bursting of the ICT bubble. In this argument, Prof Ito took it for 
granted that ZIRP should be effective in overcoming deflation, but no theoretical or empirical 
evidence is provided throughout his paper.  
Prof Ito’s third critical review on QE, ie increases in excess reserves, appears twofold. One is 
that the BOJ did not adopt a non-conventional monetary policy in addition to the actually 
adopted purchase of long-term Japanese government bonds (JGB). The other was that the 
BOJ did not explicitly spell out economic conditions under which it would exit from QE, nor 
did it adopt inflation targeting. Here again, Prof Ito took it for granted that QE should be 
effective, without discussing the transmission channels whereby QE could contribute to 
overcoming deflation, or providing any evidence on them. 
The BOJ’s monetary policy mix of ZIRP and QE can be disentangled into the effectiveness of 
three policy instruments: (1) ZIRP per se without QE, (2) ZIRP with QE and (3) QE per se, 
whose effectiveness goes beyond the effectiveness of ZIRP per se. Let me briefly discuss 
each of them.  
First, the effectiveness of ZIRP per se without QE (actually adopted in February 1999) was 
viewed with scepticism by many academics for the following reason. If the zero bound 
problem was combined with the downward spiral expectations of deflation, the interest rate 
would get increasingly higher in real terms, causing deeper recession and hence deflation. 
Indeed, the actual deflation of core CPI (excluding fresh foods only) worsened from 0% to  
–1% (at maximum) during early 1999- early 2002. However, no empirical evidence has been 
given by any academics about the downward spiral of deflation expectations. Hence, no 
evidence has been provided about the increasingly higher interest rate in real terms under 
the zero bound problem. In contrast, Hori and Shimizutani (2004) showed there were no 
such downward deflation expectations by the Japanese household sector, which anticipated 
future deflation only by less than half of the actual deflation a year ahead.  
A deeper question is whether QE introduced in March 2001 contributed to such deflation-
mitigating expectations, but this question can be answered only through analysing the 
transmission channels of QE. Two channels are conceivable. One is the straight impact of 
the increased excess reserves, while the other is through influencing the future course of the 
expectations on the short-term interest rate.  
The possible transmission channel of the increased excess reserves is the impact of an 
increase in the monetary base on the rate of return on financial assets which are imperfect 
substitutes for money (unlike government short-term securities under zero interest rate). 
Many empirical studies indicated that the estimated impact was not statistically significant or 
extremely small even if statistically significant (for example, a 10 trillion (about 2% of GDP) 
increase in excess reserves affects only 1-4 basis points of Aa bonds (Kimura and Small, 
2006)).  
In contrast, increased excess reserves are found to impact on the future course of short-term 
interest rate expectations. The estimated impacts on flattening the yield curve are found for 
three- to five-year maturity bonds, and a 0.4-0.5 percentage decline at maximum on five-year 
bonds (Baba et al (2005), Oda and Ueda (2005), Okina and Shiratuska (2004)). 
Given these rather positive impacts of QE on the medium-term yield curve, there remains an 
important puzzle about the actual channels through which QE contributed to the recovery of 
the Japanese economy from mid-2002. Actual business investment started to expand rather 
strongly after 2003 but such a demand effect of QE through stimulating investment has not 
been detected empirically. It has been suggested by many researchers that such a potential 
positive impact of QE was offset by balance sheet restructuring by companies which were 
engaged in reducing large excess debt and increasing cash flows (ie operational profits 
minus business investment).  BIS Papers No 31  139
 
 
Furthermore, in academic discussions of the effectiveness of QE, the definition of QE has 
become blurred, that is, whether QE means increases in excess reserves or high levels of 
excess reserves. This question arises because excess reserves stopped increasing in March 
2004 at the level of about 30 trillion yen (6% of GDP) after having increased by 15 trillion yen 
in one year under the new Governor Fukui, who took office in March 2003, following about a 
15 trillion yen increase in two years under the previous Governor Hayami (see Figure 5 in 
Prof Ito’s paper). It remains unclear which matters: increases, or high levels of excess 
reserves. Another puzzle is the continued recovery and expansion of the Japanese economy 
during the latest few years (2004-06) even after excess reserves stopped increasing. 
Eventually such economic expansion contributed to reducing deflationary pressure, resulting 
in the exit from QE in March 2006. 
Yet another related but unsettled issue is how QE actually contributed to stabilising the 
banking system. The resolution of this issue requires careful estimates of private banks’ 
demand for excess reserves in the face of the possible bank run on deposits. Banks’ demand 
for excess reserves may have changed over time, reflecting capital injection by the 
government in 1999, the establishment of the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) in 2001, 
the tough measures enforced by the FSA to reduce non-performing loans (NPLs) in 2003, 
the rescue operation of one relatively large bank, Resona, in 2004, the introduction of the 
ceiling on the amount of the government guaranteed deposits in 2005, etc. Only by 
estimating the changing demand for excess reserves will we understand how QE contributed 
to the stability of the banking system by allowing private financial institutions to freely dispose 
of excess reserves in case of deposit runs. 
The last important analytical issue to be settled is the causality between deflation and 
recession. Many academics claimed that without overcoming deflation, recession would 
deepen through increasingly higher real interest rates, but the reality is that the economic 
recovery and expansion after mid-2002 was in fact sustained under declining public works 
expenditure, which was traditional Keynesian fiscal policy in Japan, and reduced deflation by 
narrowing the GDP gap towards zero by the end of 2005. 
In sum, Prof Ito’s critical review on monetary policy in Japan under deflation is very useful in 
deepening our understanding how the BOJ Board members actually debated and divided in 
opinion regarding ZIRP and QE. However, this critical review appears to be based on the 
presumption that both ZIRP and QE were effective in overcoming deflation and contributing 
to the economic recovery. Unfortunately, however, the absence of his own evaluation on the 
effectiveness of ZIRP and QE weakens his criticism against policy actions of the BOJ during 
1998-2006.  
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